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Abstract
In this comment, I reply to two objections John Tate raises against my discussion of the
trajectory of Locke’s ideas on toleration (in an earlier article published in EJPT, ‘Locke’s
Tracts and the Anarchy of the Religious Conscience’) Tate maintains that I misunder-
stand the role of natural law and civil peace in Locke’s thought. I defend my interpret-
ation of the role of natural law and show that Tate is mistaken in his claim that Locke’s
concern to preserve civil peace conflicted with his separate concern to protect indi-
vidual rights.
Keywords
Locke, natural law, civil peace, toleration, rights
In his earliest political writings, the Two Tracts on Government (1660–62), Locke
held that the right to religious toleration did not protect anything other than the
freedom of inward religious judgment. In An Essay on Toleration (1667), by con-
trast, he embraces the view that religious toleration should extend to liberty of
action in worship. Divine worship, he say, deserves ‘an absolute and universal right
to toleration’. (1667: 136)
What explains Locke’s change of mind regarding the extent of religious toler-
ation? In Bou-Habib (2015) I argued that there are two parts to that answer. First,
Locke’s understanding of the scope of political authority evolves from one text to
the other. The Tracts evince a Hobbesian understanding of political authority
according to which ‘the object and matter of legislative power . . . [is] all indiﬀerent
things’. (1660–62: 71, my italics). By ‘indiﬀerent things’ Locke means all actions
that God has not already regulated. The Essay limits the scope of political author-
ity as follows: ‘What was the end of erecting government ought alone to be the
measure of its proceeding’ (1667: 135, my italics). As Locke repeatedly emphasises
in the Essay, people establish government only to protect themselves against harm,
and given that the religious worship of others is (in its ordinary instances) harmless,
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the ends of government do not justify the regulation of indiﬀerent action in
worship.
Secondly, Locke alters his view concerning the status of indiﬀerent action in
worship. Consider the most striking passage of the Essay:
[I]n religious worship nothing is indiﬀerent, for it being the using of those habits,
gestures, etc. and no other, which I think acceptable to God in my worshipping of
him, however they may be in their own nature perfectly indiﬀerent, yet when I am
worshipping my God in a way I think he has prescribed and will approve of, I cannot
alter, omit, or add any circumstance in that I think the true way of worship.
(1667: 139)
Whereas in the Tracts, Locke had said: ‘indiﬀerent things, even those regarding
divine worship, must be subjected to governmental power’ (1660–62: 69), in the
above passage he says, by stark contrast, that the duty of sincerity transforms the
status of an otherwise indiﬀerent action, so that it now falls outside of the govern-
ment’s jurisdiction.
Both of these developments in Locke’s thinking have their source in reﬂections
on natural law that he undertook in his Essays on the Law of Nature (1663). I think
Locke saw in natural law the promise of a kind of ‘public reason’ that would limit
the extent to which people would quarrel about the ends of government, and began
veering away from the Hobbesian injunction he had endorsed in the Tracts, that
sovereign authority must be ﬁxed simply over all indiﬀerent things. I also believe
Locke’s natural law reﬂections made him more conﬁdent in the following respect:
he came to believe that people who worshipped sincerely would reason themselves
to, and comply with, their most basic natural duties, and that they could therefore
be tolerated in their actions in worship.
The significance of natural law
Tate raises two main objections to the above account of Locke’s developing views
on toleration. His ﬁrst objection is that I misunderstand the signiﬁcance of natural
law in Locke’s political thought. There are two points he makes in this connection.
The ﬁrst is about chronology. Locke mentions natural law in the Tracts, so Tate
asks the following question: ‘If Locke saw natural law as consistent with his anti-
toleration position in the Two Tracts, on what basis does it suddenly perform the
opposite service in the wake of this text and manage his transition to toleration?’
(XXXX) [AQ1]
The fact that Locke mentions natural law on several occasions in the Tracts
doesn’t imply that his thoughts about natural law couldn’t have evolved in ways
that were signiﬁcant for his views on toleration. This is especially so given the very
vague understanding of natural law displayed in the Tracts: in these texts, Locke
shows no detailed grasp of the content of natural law or how we come to know it.
He says quite simply that natural law requires order, and that order, in turn,
requires that sovereign authority must stretch over all indiﬀerent things. In the
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Essays on the Law of Nature, he develops a much more detailed understanding of
natural law. He argues that we come to know it through reﬂections on our sense
experience and he identiﬁes three main categories of natural duty: (1) to worship
god, (2) to preserve oneself and (3) to preserve society.1
Locke’s description of the natural duty of worship is particularly noteworthy.
He writes of man that
When he in himself ﬁnds sense-experience and reason, he feels himself disposed and
ready to contemplate God’s works . . . and thereupon to assign and render praise,
honour, and glory most worthy of so great and so beneﬁcent a creator. (1663: 105–106)
The above passage suggests a further reason, in addition to the one I had put
forward in Bou-Habib (2015), for why Locke’s reﬂections on natural law might
have led him to argue that action in sincere worship must be tolerated. The Tracts
were mainly concerned with rejecting a particular argument Edward Bagshaw had
made in favour of toleration, which appealed to a general liberty of conscience.
Locke believed that if, as Bagshaw suggested, each individual must have a right to
follow his conscience, there could be no political authority. I think Locke’s reﬂec-
tions on natural law helped him to see that there is a diﬀerent case for why actions
in worship must be tolerated – diﬀerent, that is, from the anarchical, conscience-
based case Bagshaw made, and this is, simply, that religious worship is a natural
duty. This diﬀerent basis for toleration does not have anarchical implications: to
have a right to worship is a more narrow privilege than having a right to follow
one’s conscience. As Locke subsequently puts it in the Essay, ‘[r]eligious wor-
ship, . . . being an action or commerce passing only between God and myself, had
in its own nature no reference at all to my governor, or to my neighbour and so
necessarily produces no action which disturbs the community’. (1667: 138)
The other point Tate makes in connection with my understanding of the role of
natural law in Locke is more diﬃcult to grasp. He says that I assume that Locke
believes that natural law is a source of civil harmony, whereas, in fact, ‘Locke, in
his later political writings, came to see natural law as a source of conﬂict rather
than ‘‘harmony’’’. (XXXX) According to Tate, Locke came to believe that natural
law ‘is of no use in the practical management of political authority’ (XXXX). He
observes that Locke increasingly emphasizes the idea that contract sets the scope of
political authority: ‘Unlike natural law . . .which is present in the Two Tracts, ‘‘con-
tract’’ (and its corollary of individual consent) is a new normative source that
Locke aﬃrms in the wake of the Two Tracts’. (XXXX). It is this idea, Tate
thinks, that explains Locke’s eventual endorsement of toleration.
Let me make two points in response. The ﬁrst is that Tate misunderstands
Locke’s views on natural law. It is indeed central to Locke’s thought that people
will disagree about the content of natural law and about how to apply it in par-
ticular cases. That is why people must enter into political society with each other so
that ‘all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the commu-
nity comes to be umpire’ (1689: §87). But it doesn’t follow from this that Locke
thinks natural law is of no use in the practical management of political authority.
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Locke states quite clearly that the ‘Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to all
men, Legislators as well as others. The Rules that they make for other Mens
Actions, must, . . . be conformable to the Law of Nature’ (1689: §135).2 To say,
as Tate does, that disagreement about natural law makes it of no use in the prac-
tical management of political authority is a bit like saying that moral disagreement
makes morality useless in politics.
Furthermore, Tate contrasts contract and natural law as alternative sources of
political authority, whereas, in fact, they combine as one source in Locke’s
thought. They do this, ﬁrst, in determining who should have authority over
whom: natural law asserts that we are all by nature equal, in the sense that no
one is subordinate to another in jurisdiction over his own aﬀairs (1689: §4), and this
is why Locke believes that that no one can come to have authority over another
other than by contract.3 Natural law and contract combine also to set the scope of
political authority because political authority, ‘being but the joint power of every
member of the society given up to that person or assembly, which is legislator, it
can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature’, (§135) which is, of
course, the (jurisdictional) power that natural law had given them. And, further-
more, because natural law sets limits to the power each person has over himself (it
forbids him destroying himself), it also explains why political authority cannot be
absolute: ‘no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself; and
no body has absolute power over himself ’. (§135)
Secondly, it is not clear to me why Tate thinks I attribute to Locke the view that
people are going to agree about the content and application of natural law. Perhaps
Tate thinks that that view necessarily goes along with my claim that natural law
sets the scope of political authority. But that isn’t correct. One can acknowledge
that individuals will disagree about the content and application of natural law,
compatibly with believing that natural law sets the scope of political authority. One
can hold that because individuals disagree about natural law, they must agree to
obey the will of their representatives in a legislature, while also holding that those
legislators must constrain their legislation in ways that enable individuals to fulﬁll
the natural duties they would consent that government enable them to fulﬁll, and
enjoy the natural rights they would consent that government protect.
Civil peace
Tate’s second objection is directed at my interpretation of the role of civil peace in
Locke’s political thought. In my view, Locke does not make the right of religious
freedom depend on what the consequences of respecting it would be for civil peace.
This would imply that he would, for example, advocate withholding toleration for
religious minorities when more powerful groups, who oppose their being tolerated,
threaten violence, and this I said would amount to an unjust concession to the
powerful at the expense of the powerless. I concluded that the civil peace inter-
pretation of Locke’s position on toleration wasn’t compatible with his statements
about the rights that individual dissenters have to being tolerated. So far as I can
tell, Tate agrees with this, but rather than inferring, as I do, that Locke could not
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have endorsed the civil peace-based case for toleration, he concludes that Locke’s
political thought rested on imperatives that were at odds with each other.
Two points help to clarify the disagreement between Tate and me over the role
of civil peace in Locke’s political thought. First, we should distinguish between two
versions of the civil peace interpretation. On an extreme version of it, Locke bases
his early rejection and later endorsement of toleration solely on the consequences
for civil peace. On the moderate version, he takes the consequences for civil peace
into account, alongside the interests individuals have in being free from religious
persecution. Tate clearly endorses the moderate version: he says that Locke comes
to support toleration not only because of a concern for civil peace, but also because
of a widening commitment to individual liberty.4 I was concerned to reject the
extreme version (though I should have made this clearer).5 I was mainly concerned
to show that Locke defends toleration because he cares about the interests that
persons have in being able to worship sincerely.
Secondly, and having said this, Tate and I do disagree about exactly how civil
peace is relevant for Locke. Tate sees Locke’s concern for civil peace as being in
conﬂict with the rights of individuals. The implication of this reading is that Locke
is prepared to put up with injustice for the sake of peace. In support of this reading,
Tate draws attention to Locke’s discussion of the right of resistance to government.
Locke argues that recognizing a right of resistance is compatible with maintaining
civil peace because the larger part of the community will never be disposed to take
up arms against government in support of a few individuals until ‘the ill designs of
the rulers become visible, or their attempts sensible to the greater part’ (1689: §230).
Tate explains Locke’s reasoning as follows:
He [Locke] declares . . . that individual religious dissidents who engage in such resist-
ance, no matter how valid their cause, are ‘‘busie heads’’ and ‘‘turbulent spirits’’,
subject to ‘‘just ruine and perdition’’. . .Locke is engaging in precisely that ‘‘unjust
concession . . . to the prejudices of the powerful at the expense of the rights of the
powerless’’ of which Bou-Habib thought him incapable. (XXXX)
In fact, it is far from evident, in my view, that Locke is engaging in an unjust
concession to the prejudices of the powerful in his discussion of the right of resist-
ance. Note two points about that discussion: ﬁrst, the kind of ‘resistance’ Locke is
talking about is not self-defense, but the endeavour to alter government by force.
Secondly, Locke does not say that individuals are subject to just ruin no matter how
valid their cause. That is Tate’s phrase. What Locke does say is that a disruption of
civil peace will not occur ‘whenever it shall please a busie head, or turbulent spirit,
to desire the alteration of government’. (1689: §230)
These two points help to reduce the appearance of injustice in Locke’s argument
and allows us to see a more reasonable attitude behind it. He is assuming that if
individuals impose the grave risk on others (and themselves) of seeking to alter
government by force when the injustices they believe they suﬀer are not general but
conﬁned to a few instances, then they are subject to just ruin when the rest of the
community don’t back them up. That, to me, is not an unjust concession to the
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powerful at the expense of the powerless. It is not unjust to argue that people
should refrain from using force against governments that are broadly legitimate.
(It would be a diﬀerent matter, of course, if a government perpetrated, or was
intent on perpetrating, widespread abuses.) Tate’s view that there is a serious con-
ﬂict between civil peace and individual rights in Locke’s political thought therefore
appears unwarranted.
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Notes
1. See Locke (1663: 106). As Wolfgang Von Leyden points out, in identifying these three
categories of natural duty, Locke rehearses the main precepts of natural law according to
Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae, q. 94, art. 2. See Von Leyden’s edition of Locke’s
Essays on the Law of Nature (1663 [1988]), p. 159.
2. Jeremy Waldron provides a good statement of how Locke saw the relationship between
the law of nature and positive legislation: ‘To the extent that members of the society dis-
agree about this [i.e. the law of nature] – to the extent that natural law is controversial –
legislation just is the adjudication of those controversies’ (1999: 86).
3. I think Tate is misled into assuming that Locke contrasts contract and natural law
because Locke contrasts contract with the idea that monarchy is ‘jure divino’ (1667:
135). The latter idea has nothing to do with natural law – it is the different idea that
God has directly assigned political authority to the monarch.
4. But note that Tate’s claim that Locke moves towards a more toleration-friendly position
because of a widening commitment to liberty doesn’t really explain that development in
Locke’s thought: it just describes it. We know that Locke comes to acquire a wider
commitment to individual liberty: the question is why.
5. I wanted to reject the view that Locke ‘defends the right to toleration in An Essay on
Toleration. . .only because he now believes it is toleration, rather than imposition, that is
most conducive to civil peace’ (Bou-Habib 2015: 13).
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